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STATE SUCCESSION AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS: POLITICAL CRITERIA v. PROTECTION OF
OUTSTANDING FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
PAUL

R. WILLIAMS*

WITH the

dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) and the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
(Czechoslovakia), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) were
forced to confront enigmatic questions of State succession concerning the
continuing membership of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and the competing claims for that membership by a variety of successor States. The
typically intricate questions of State succession were further complicated
by the international pariah status of Serbia/Montenegro, the State with
the best claim to Yugoslavia's inheritance, and the combined outstanding
obligations of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to the financial institutions
totalling over $3.5 billion.
The primary questions faced by the IMF and World Bank as a result of
the break-up of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were:
(1) What should become of the predecessor State's membership?
(2) Could certain successor States be temporarily excluded from
participation?
(3) How could payment of the outstanding obligations and arrears
of the predecessor States be best guaranteed?
(4) How could the predecessor State's assets be preserved and allocated among the successor States?
In their attempt to grapple with the questions of State succession, the
IMF and World Bank were required to balance the competing influences
of the political interests of their members with their need to protect themselves from default on the outstanding loan obligations of the former
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. This article examines how the IMF and

* Fulbright Research Scholar, University of Cambridge; Attorney-Adviser, Office of the
Legal Adviser for European and Canadian Affairs, US Department of State, 1991-3. While
at the Department of State, the author was primarily responsible for the legal aspects of US
policy on State succession. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Department of State.
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World Bank answered the questions of State succession by balancing
these competing interests and navigating through the complex law of
State succession to arrive at a new precedent for the "conditional succession" of member States. This article also identifies the dangers
involved in the adoption of this new conditional succession approach.
I. BACKGROUND

discussing the above questions, it will be useful to outline briefly
the nature of the IMF and World Bank, the history of Yugoslavia's and
Czechoslovakia's membership in the financial institutions, and an account
of the dissolution of those States.
BEFORE

A.

The Creationof the IMF and World Bank

The IMF and World Bank were established in 1944 as a result of the UN
Monetary and Financial Conference for the purpose of providing a keystone for the rebuilding of the world economy after the termination of the
Second World War.' The IMF was established to provide a mechanism to
maintain an orderly system of currency payments between international
States by lending currency to members facing balance of payments deficits.2 The World Bank was created to provide the necessary international
capital for financing the physical reconstruction of those countries devastated by the Second World War, and for financing the industrial develop-

ment of lesser-developed countries.3
In order to attain membership in the World Bank, a State must first be a
member of the IMF. 4 Membership of the IMF was originally open to those
1. The Bretton Woods Agreements (1972), pp.11-35; see also World Bank, The InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development 1946-1953 (1954), pp.4-7; and World
Bank, The World Bank, Policiesand Operations (1958), pp.2-4.
2. Bretton Woods, idem, pp.539-540. More specifically the purposes of the IMF include
promoting international monetary co-operation, facilitating the expansion and balanced
growth of international trade, promoting exchange stability, assisting in the establishment of
a multilateral system of payments and eliminating foreign exchange restrictions, and providing member States with the opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments: IMF Articles of Agreement, Art.I (as amended effective 11 Nov. 1992). The IMF's
organisation consists of a board of governors, one governor appointed from each member
State; an executive board, five members appointed by the five member States having the
largest contributions, and 15 appointed by the other member States; a managing director,
selected by the executive board; and staff of the managing director: idem, Art. XII.
3. World Bank (1954), op. cit. supra n.1, at p.4. More specifically the purposes of the
World Bank are to assist in the reconstruction and development of member States, promote
private foreign investments, and promote the long-range balanced growth of international
trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments. World Bank Articles of
Agreement, Art.l (as amended effective 16 Feb. 1989). The organisation of the World Bank
consists of a board of governors, executive directors, a bank president, and staff appointed in
the same manner as their counterparts in the IMF: idem, Art.V.
4. World Bank Articles of Agreement, Art.II(1)(b). This requirement is significant as
the manner in which the IMF addresses the issue of succession to membership can substantially affect the membership of successor States in the World Bank.
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States attending the UN Monetary and Financial Conference in 1944.1
Subsequent membership is open to any State seeking it, subject to such
terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors.' If
a member State of the World Bank ceases to continue its membership in
the IMF, that State's membership of the World Bank terminates three
months after its IMF membership, unless the Board of Governors decides
by a three-fourths majority vote to permit the State to maintain its
membership.7
B.

The Creationof Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and Their
Membership in the IMF and World Bank

The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was created on 31 January
1946, following the conclusion of the Second World War. The Yugoslav
Federation consisted of the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. In 1974 the Yugoslav Federation adopted a new constitution and reconstituted itself as the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 1920 Peace Treaty of Trianon, conceived by the victorious powers in the First World War, created the State
of Czechoslovakia out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire." The Czech and
Slovak Republics constituted the administrative divisions of this new
State.9
Both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were original members of the
IMF and World Bank.' Czechoslovakia's membership was terminated in
1954, for failure to pay the full share of its capital subscription as required
by the Articles of Agreement." Czechoslovakia was readmitted in September 1990.12 During the course of Yugoslavia's membership of the IMF,
it accumulated outstanding financial obligations in the amount of $216.76
million (155.59 million SDRs). 13 In the course of its membership of the

5. IMF Articles of Agreement, Art.II(1). All the States represented at the UN Conference became members of the IMF and World Bank except the former USSR, Liberia and
New Zealand: World Bank (1954), op. cit. supra n.1, at p.12.
6. IMF Articles of Agreement, Art.II(2).
7. World Bank Articles of Agreement, Art.VI(3).
8. Peace Treaty of Trianon: Treaties, Conventions, InternationalActs, Protocols,and
Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923 (1923),
p.3 5 5 8 .
9. For an examination of the origins of Czechoslovakia see W. V. Wallace, Czecho-Slovakia (1976).
10. Bretton Woods, supra n.1, App.C, at pp.800-802.
11. Idem, p.171.
12. World Bank, Czech Republic andSlovak Republic-Successionto MembershipStatus
of the Czech and Slovak FederalRepublic (23 Dec. 1992), p.3 .
13. IMF Press Release No.92/92 (15 Dec. 1992), p.2. SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) are
international reserve assets created by the IMF and allocated to members to supplement
their existing reserve assets.
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World Bank, Yugoslavia actively borrowed and acquired $4.8 billion in
14
loans, with $1.977 billion disbursed and outstanding.
During the course of Czechoslovakia's membership of the IMF, it
accumulated outstanding financial obligations in the amount of $1,562.41
million (1,121.50 million SDRs). 15 Czechoslovakia acquired a $450-million structural adjustment loan during the course of its membership of the
World Bank, half of which had been paid out by June 1991, and a second
loan for the purposes of financing a power and environmental improve6
ment project located within the territory of the Czech Republic.
C.

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia

Seeking the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation of the
republics of Yugoslavia, Slovenia conducted a referendum on 23 December 1990, in which 88.4 per cent of the population voted in favour of
declaring Slovenia a sovereign and independent State. 7 Croatia joined
with Slovenia and the republics issued a joint statement in February 1991,
invalidating Yugoslav laws on their territory and demanding the formation of a confederation of republics. Yugoslavia resisted these attempts to
transform the relationship of the Yugoslav republics. Finding no satisfaction from Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia issued proclamations of independence on 25 June 1991.18 By December 1991 Slovenia and Croatia
introduced their own currencies and adopted new constitutions. 9 The Eu14. World Bank, SocialistFederalRepublic of Yugoslavia Cessation of Membership and
Succession to Membership (11 Feb. 1993), p.3. In a separate World Bank document, the
figure for aggregate loan amounts equals $4.1 billion with $2.1 billion outstanding: World
Bank, Bank Portfolio of Loans in the Former Yugoslav Republics (25 Nov. 1992), p.1 . See
also statement by Mr Johannes Linn, Vice President, Financial Policy and Risk Management, to the IMF executive board meeting (4 Dec. 1992), p.1 . On the basis of interim agreements with the Yugoslav successor States and the physical location of World Bank projects,
the World Bank apportioned the outstanding debts of the former Yugoslavia as follows:
Macedonia-153.98 million (7.5%); Croatia-155.19 million (7.6%); Slovenia-$160.59
million (7.8%); Bosnia-Herzegovina-439.24 million (21.4%); Serbia/Montenegro$1,141.05 million (55.7%): Bank Portfolio, ibid.
15. World Bank, Staff Report for Review Under Stand-By Arrangement (14 Oct. 1992),
p. 1 .
16. World Bank, op. cit. supran.12, at p.2. In order to receive the power and environment
loan, the Czech Republic "agreed to fully guarantee the loan after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia": ibid.
17. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee Opinion No.7, On Recognition of
Slovenia by the EC and its Member States (1992) 31 I.L.M. 1512, 1513.
18. Slovenia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (report submitted to
the Committee on Foreign Relations US Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs US
House of Representatives by the Department of State) (Feb. 1993), p.907; and Croatia
Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (report submitted to the same two
committees by the Department of State) (Feb. 1993), p.740.
19. Arbitration Commission Opinion No.7, supra n.17, at p.1512; and Conference on
Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee Opinion No.5, On Recognition of Croatia by the EC and
its Member States (1992) 31 I.L.M. 1503, 1504.
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ropean Community recognised Slovenia and Croatia as independent
States on 15 January 1992,20 with the United States recognising these
States on 7 April 1992.1 The United Nations admitted Slovenia and Croatia as new members on 22 May 1992.22
The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina conducted a referendum on 29
February and 1 March 1992, in which 63 per cent of the electorate voted to
pursue independence from Yugoslavia.23 The European Community 24 and
the United Statesl recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina on 7 April 1992, with
the United Nations admitting it as a new member on 22 May 1992.26
The Republic of Macedonia conducted a referendum on 8 September
1991 on the subject of independence,27 and adopted a new constitution and
declared independence in November 1991.28 Macedonia attained UN
membership on 8 April 1993,29 and is recognised by a number of nations,
including Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania, 0 Slovenia, Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina," 11 member States of the European Community,32 and the
United States. The United States has, however, refused to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia, at the request of Greece.33
The remaining two Yugoslav republics, Serbia and Montenegro,
declared the formation of a joint State named the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) on 27 April 1992.M This joint State has
not been recognised by the European Community or the United States.

20. Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol.38, No.1, p.38703 (Jan. 1992).
21. White House Press Release (7 Apr. 1992).
22. Keesing's, supra n.20, Vol.38, Nos.7-8, at p.39033 (July 1992).
23. Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (report
submitted to the two committees supran.18 by the Department of State) (Feb. 1993), p.719.
24. Keesing's, supra n.20, Vol.38, No.1, at p.38848 (Jan. 1992).
25. White House Press Release, supra n.21, at p.1.
26. Keesing's, loc. cit. supra n.22.
27. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Committee Opinion No.6, On Recognition of
Macedonia by the EC and its Member States (1992) 31 I.L.M. 1507, 1508.
28. Macedonia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (report submitted to
the two committees supra n.18 by the Department of State) (Feb. 1993), p. 8 3 9 .
29. For UN purposes, Macedonia is required to use the name the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia until the name controversy between Macedonia and Greece is
resolved.
30. Keesing's, supra n.20, Vol.38, Nos.7-8, at p. 3 9 0 3 6 (Aug. 1992).
31. Idem, Vol.38, No.4, p.3 8 8 5 0 (Apr. 1992).
32. Originally, the EC member States had decided they would not recognise Macedonia
under any title which included the name "Macedonia": Lisbon Declaration of 26-27 June, in
Keesing's, idem, Vol.38, No.6, p. 38 9 4 3 (June 1992).
33. Greece believes that the use of the name Macedonia implies territorial claims by
Macedonia on the northern province of Greece, which is also named Macedonia. See Macedonia Report, loc. cit. supra n.28.
34. Seibia/Montenegro Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992 (report submitted to the two committees supra n.18 by the Department of State) (Feb. 1993), p.8 9 7 .
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Claims of continuity

The break-up of a State can generally be characterised as either a continuation or a dissolution. In the case of continuation, one or more subState entities breaks away from the predecessor State and forms an independent State. What remains of the predecessor State is referred to as the
continuing State (or continuity of the predecessor State), and generally
retains the rights and obligations of the predecessor State.35 The breakaway States are referred to as successor States. In the case of dissolution,
States, with
the predecessor State dissolves into a number of successor
36
none of them being considered the continuing State.
The characterisation of the break-up of a state as a continuation or a
dissolution has a variety of consequences for the continuation of that
State's international rights and obligations.37 The extent of those consequences is, of course, subject to various interpretations. The consequences of these alternative models of break-up will be discussed below in
the context of the membership of the Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian
successor States in the IMF and World Bank, and their responsibility for
the debt obligations of their predecessor States.
Serbia/Montenegro claims that the break-up of Yugoslavia follows the
model of continuation, and that it is the continuing State of the former
Yugoslavia, and thereby entitled to all the rights and obligations of Yugoslavia2 8 Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina explicitly contest Serbia/Montenegro's claim to be the continuing State of Yugoslavia and
35. The case of continuation is most frequently associated with the independence of colonies, where the colonial power maintains its status as the continuing State and the ex-colony
is granted status as a newly independent State.
36. The case of dissolution is most frequently associated with the devolution of joint
States or empires, examples being the dissolution of the United Arab Republic into Egypt
and Syria, and the dissolution of Greater Colombia into Panama, Colombia and Venezuela,
where all the successor States are treated as equal.
37. The Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect to Treaties (contained in the
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its
20th Session, UN Doc.A/9610/Rev.1, p.260 (July 1974)) takes the position that if a State
breaks up, all its successor States are generally bound by the treaty rights and obligations of
the predecessor State, whether or not the predecessor State continues. The Convention also
takes the position (ibid) that if a treaty relates only to a portion of the territory of a predecessor State, the successor State having authority over that territory will be bound by the
treaty, while the other successor States will not be. The US restatement of the law of foreign
relations, on the other hand, takes the position that none of the successor States are bound by
the treaty rights and obligations of the predecessor State if the State dissolves: Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations (1987), s.210. However, in the case of a continuation, the predecessor State is bound by the treaty and other obligations but the breakaway State is not: ibid.
38. Diplomatic Note No.8/1/92 to the US Department of State from the Embassy of the
SFR of Yugoslavia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Serbia/Montenegro's position might
be supported by the ICJ's judgment on the genocide application by Bosnia-Herzegovina of 8
Apr. 1993, wherein it held the Genocide Convention provided a prima facie basis for its
jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures because the SFRY was a party to the Convention, and Serbia/Montenegro filed a declaration to know those obligations.
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assert in the alternative that Yugoslavia has dissolved, and all the successor States should be treated equally. 9 The United States also rejects
°
Serbia/Montenegro's claim to be the continuing State of Yugoslavia.
The States of the European Community similarly take the position that
Yugoslavia has dissolved, and thereby Serbia/Montenegro may not claim
4
to be the continuing State. '
In the United Nations, while Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Macedonia have applied for and received new membership, Serbia/
Montenegro refuses to apply for new membership and insists it is entitled
to assume the membership of the former Yugoslavia. In response to Serbia/Montenegro's claim to assume the seat of Yugoslavia, the United
Nations passed Security Council Resolution 757, stating in part: "the
claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally
accepted".4 1 Subsequently, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
777, which effectively excluded Serbia/Montenegro from participating in
the United Nations as the continuation of Yugoslavia. 43
2. Economic sanctionsagainst Serbia/Montenegro
In order to deter Serbia/Montenegro from continuing its aggression and
interference in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN Security Council imposed
39. Letter from Dimitrij Rupel, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Slovenia, to Peter
Hohenfeliner, President of the UN Security Council and Permanent Representative of Austria to the UN; and Note Verbale from Republic of Croatia to US Mission to the UN (30 June
1992).
40. US Mission to the UN Press Release USUN 36-(92) (30 May 1992), stating in part:
"[The US government] has already informed both the Security Council and the General
Assembly that it does not believe that the authorities in Belgrade represent the continuation
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I note that many other countries
have reserved their position on the continuity issue and quite a few have adopted the same
view as we have on this matter."
41. EC Declaration on Yugoslavia, done at Brussels on 20 June 1992. See also Keesing's,
supra n.20, Vol.38, Nos.7-8, at p.39013 (July 1992).
42. UN Doc.S/RES/757 (30 May 1992).
43. Security Council Res.777 states in part: "Recalling the state formerly known as the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist, and realizing that the claim by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the
membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations
has not been generally accepted; considering that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and therefore recommends to the General
Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the
work of the General Assembly": UN Doc.S/RES/777 (1992). The Resolution, although
designed to exclude Serbia/Montenegro from participation in the UN, is subject to substantial criticism as it also provides that the placecard of Yugoslavia shall remain in the UN,
Serbia/Montenegro may continue to occupy the Yugoslav Mission to the UN, and the Security Council will consider the matter of Serbian/Montenegrin participation at the end of the
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economic sanctions on it." The economic sanctions constituted a comprehensive embargo on imports from, or exports to, Serbia/Montenegro, with
45
the purpose of substantially disrupting its economy.
D.

The Dissolutionof Czechoslovakia

On 25 November 1992 the Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic adopted a constitutional law providing that, as of 1
January 1993, the State of Czechoslovakia would cease to exist, and would
be succeeded by the independent States of the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic (Slovakia).4 Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia were
immediately recognised by the European Community and the United
47
States.
Immediately prior to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia entered into a devolution agreement concerning
the allocation of membership in international organisations.4 This agreement provided that the Czech Republic and Slovakia would alternate the
continuity of Czechoslovakia for purposes of membership in international
organisations depending upon the nature of the organisation.4 9
Despite the existence of the devolution agreement, neither the Czech
Republic nor Slovakia continued the membership of Czechoslovakia in
the United Nations, but, rather, both States applied and were admitted as
new members on 19 January 1993.50 The United Nations did, however,
allocate the membership of Czechoslovakia in the UN subsidiary organisations to the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the manner set out in the
devolution agreement.5
47th session of the General Assembly: ibid; and Legal Opinion from Carl-August Fleis-

chauer, Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs, to Kenneth Dadzie, Under-Secretary-General
for the UN Conference on Trade and Development (29 Sept. 1992).
44. US General Accounting Office Draft Report, "Serbia-Montenegro; Implementation
of UN Economic Sanctions" (Mar. 1993).
45. Scharf and Dorsin, "Interpreting UN Sanctions: The Rulings and Role of the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee" (1993) 19 Brooklyn J.Int.L. 771.
46. Czech and Slovak Republic Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992
(report submitted to the two committeessupra n.18by the Department of State) (Feb. 1993);
and Constitutional Law on the Termination of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (25
Nov. 1992), Art.1.
47. Statement by White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Washington D.C. (1
Jan. 1993).
48. Agreement on Membership in International Governmental Organisations, signed in
Prague, 12 Dec. 1992, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic, the Minister of Foreign Relations for the Czech Republic, and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs for the Slovak Republic.
49. Ibid.
50. "Czech Republic, Slovakia Admitted to the United Nations", in FIBIS-EEU-93-013
(22 Jan. 1993), p.2; and statement of the President on the Special Session of the General
Assembly on the Admission of Membership of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic
(19 Jan. 1993).
51. Journal of the UN, No.1993/13 (part 1) (20 Jan. 1993).
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION PERTAINING TO
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, AND THE PAST PRACTICE OF THE IMF
AND WORLD BANK

primary questions faced by an international organisation upon the
break-up of one of its member States are: what becomes of the membership of the predecessor State, and what becomes of the assets and debts of
the predecessor State? As this article will discuss later, the IMF and World
Bank were faced with additional questions that arose out of the political
circumstances surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia.
Before discussing the application of the international law of State succession by the IMF and World Bank to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to give a brief account of the international
law of State succession regarding membership of international organisations and the assumption of assets and debts, and the past practice of the
IMF and World Bank in this area.
THE

A. Public InternationalLaw
Although issues of State succession have a long history in public international law, there is scant precedent regarding the specific issues of succession to membership in international organisations, and the allocation
of the assets and debts of a predecessor State.
1. Membership of internationalorganisations
Under the general rules of public international law, it is generally
assumed that upon the break-up of a State, the continuing State, if it exists,
will assume the membership of the predecessor State in international
organisations, and the newly independent State or States must seek new
membership. 2 In the case of a dissolution it is at best unclear as to which
States may inherit the membership of the predecessor State. 3 The uncertainty over whether which successor States, if any, may inherit the membership of the predecessor State upon break-up of that State is further
complicated by the fact that, until recently, no clear precedent existed,
outside the arena of decolonisation, 4 as to how to determine whether the
break-up of a State is a continuation or dissolution.
The break-up of British India into the States of India and Pakistan was
generally considered as a case of continuation, with India being treated as
52. This principle has been applied almost exclusively in the case of decolonisation: D. P.
O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law & International Law, Vol.II (1967),
pp. 1 84 - 18 7 .
53. Idem, pp.198-200.
54. For an examination of the issue of treaty succession in the context of decolonisation,
see McNair, The Law ofTreaties (1986), pp.640-654.

OCTOBER

1994]

State Succession: IMFand World Bank

785

the continuity of British India.5 In the case of the break-up of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Russia was generally considered to be the continuation of the Soviet Union. 6 Although the case of the former Yugoslavia is still outstanding in many international organisations, it is generally
considered that no successor State is the continuation but, rather, that the
57
former Yugoslavia dissolved and all successor States are treated equally.
And although the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia is also outstanding in many international organisations, neither the Czech Republic
nor Slovakia is considered to be the continuing State.
One consistency that can be found among these precedents is that the
continuing State, if one exists, retains a substantial portion of the predecessor State's population, territory and resources. 8 The determination of
continuity has also been affected by the existence of a devolution agreement between the successor States indicating that a particular successor
State should assume the predecessor State's membership in international
organisations 9
55. Idem, pp.648-649 (citing UN Press Release, P.M.473 (12 Aug. 1947)).
56. Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Adviser for the US Department of State, "Remarks at
the Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law"
(1992) Am.Soc.Int.L. 10, 13-14.
57. On 22 May 1992, on the occasion of the admission of Slovenia, Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina to the UN, the US Permanent Representative to the UN stated: "If Serbia and
Montenegro desire to sit in the United Nations, they should be required to apply for membership and be held to the same standards as all other applicants": US Mission to the UN
Press Release USUN 35-(92) (22 May 1992).
58. In connection with the creation of Pakistan, the UN determined that India possessed
the characteristics necessary to constitute the continuation of British India in 1947: Legal
Opinion of the Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, 17 UN GAOR Supp. No.9,
para.72; UN Doc.A/5209; A/CN, 4/149, p.2 . This determination is consistent with the fact
that India retained 80% of the former population of British India, 75 % of the territory and a
substantial portion of the resources. In the more recent case of the break-up of the Soviet
Union, the Russian Federation has been generally viewed, particularly by several European
countries, as the continuation of the former Soviet Union, and permitted to occupy its seat in
the UN General Assembly, the Security Council and other bodies within the UN system.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia retained over 55 % of the population, 77%
of the territory and a significant portion of the resources. Unlike India and Russia, Serbia and
Montenegro did not constitute a substantial majority of the population, territory or
resources of the former Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro constitutes approximately
39.1% of the territory, 43% of the population and 36.7% of the GNP of the former Yugoslavia: Keesing's, supra n.20, Vol.38, Nos.7-8, at R130 (Aug. 1992). In US Mission to the UN
Press Release USUN 83-(92) the US declared: "We find ourselves in an unprecedented
situation. For the first time, the United Nations is facing the dissolution of one of its members
without agreement by the successor states on the status of the original UN seat. Moreover,
none of the former republics of the former Yugoslavia is so clearly a predominant portion of
the original State so as to be entitled to be treated as the continuation of that state." The
contradictory case is that of Czechoslovakia, where the break-up was treated as a dissolution
in the UN despite the fact that the Czech Republic appears to retain 66% of the former
Czechoslovakia's population, 62% of the territory and 71% of the resources: "Little Joy as
Czechs Slovaks Split", Washington Post, 1 Jan. 1993, Sec.A21.
59. India and Pakistan entered into a devolution agreement stating that India would
maintain the membership of British India in all international organisations: Indian Indepen-
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2. The assumption of assets and debts
(a) Debts. Under international law State debt obligations are generally
divided into the categories of "debts contracted in the general interest by
the national government of the state" (national debt), "debts contracted
by the national government of the state for identifiable projects in a specif-6
ic region" (territorial debt), and "debts of local government entities". 0
The debts of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia to the IMF and World Bank
are both national debt and territorial debt.
The international law governing State succession to international debt
is governed both by State practice and the 1983 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of State Property and Debts (1983 Vienna
Convention). 6' The State practice with regard to national debt in the circumstances of a continuation of a State is that the continuing State is obligated to the full amount of the predecessor State's national debt, 62 unless
there is agreement between the continuing State and the breakaway State
as to the allocation of the national debt, or unless the breakaway State63
agrees with the creditors to be obligated to a certain portion of the debt.
Although there is virtually no clear State practice with regard to the
assumption of debts by successor States in the case of a dissolution, 6 interdence (International Agreements) Order, quoted in 2 UN GAOR Sixth Committee, Annex
6c, pp. 30 8 - 3 10; Doc.A/C.6/161. In the Alma Ata Accords, Russia obtained formal agreement by all the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that it should be
permitted to occupy the seat of the former Soviet Union in UN bodies: "Text of Accords by
Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth", New York Times, 23 Dec. 1991,
sec.1, p. 10 .Russia was also most likely permitted to retain the UN seat of the former Soviet
Union because of circumstances such as two of the larger Soviet republics, Ukraine and
Byelorussia, having through historical anomaly been members of the UN since its inception,
and therefore the residual Soviet Union for UN purposes has always constituted Russia.
Additionally, Russia continued as one of the five nuclear weapon States under the NonProliferation Treaty and it was thus consistent for Russia to occupy the Security Council seat
of the Soviet Union along with the other four nuclear weapon States, Unlike India and Russia, no devolution agreement exists among the republics of the former Yugoslavia. In fact,
each of the now independent Yugoslav republics has asserted that the former Yugoslavia has
dissolved, and that no individual State is entitled to assume the continuity of Yugoslavia,
60. US Department of State, Memorandum of Law: Obligations of Predecessor and Successor States for Public Debts (1972), p.1 .
61. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives
and Debts, UN Doc.A/CONF.117/14 (7 Apr. 1983). The Convention has not entered into
force, and is not generally considered to be a codification of customary international law.
62. The continuing State is generally considered to be obligated to the predecessor's debts
under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (an agreement must be kept): State Department
Memorandum, supra n.60, at p.3.
63. Idem, pp.2-4. In most circumstances of State succession, the breakaway States have
consented to being obligated by a portion of the national debt of the predecessor State: idem,
p.11, citing Keith, Theory of State Succession (1907), p.490. For a detailed listing of successor
State assumption of national debt see Phillipson, Termination of War and Treaties of Peace
(1961), pp.323-326. For a discussion of the history of the assumption of assets and debts by
successor States in the period of decolonisation see Feilchenfeld, Public Debts and State
Succession (1931).
64. O'Connell, op. cit. supra n.52, at pp.387-394. The following cases of dissolution emit
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national law would be likely to apply the same doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which holds a continuing State liable in the case of continuation, to
hold the individual successor States liable where a State has dissolved and
there is no continuing State.65
With regard to territorial debt, State practice is for successor States to
assume liability for any debt associated with the acquisition of specific
property or benefits within a particular successor State's territory. 6 The
obligation of the successor States arises from the doctrines of unjust
enrichment and acquired rights. 67 In this instance, State practice does not
draw a distinction between cases of continuation or dissolution. Finally,
State practice provides that the creditor must consent to any agreement
between the successor States allocating the debt. This practice exists to
prevent the successor States from allocating the debt in such a manner that
it is unlikely to be repaid.
The 1983 Vienna Convention does not draw a distinction between the
cases of continuation or dissolution 8 Neither does the Convention draw a
distinction between national and territorial debt. 69 The primary principle
underlying the Convention is that the rights of the creditor States or enti70
ties should not be prejudiced by the dissolution of the debtor State.
The 1983 Vienna Convention therefore provides that in the case of the
break-up of a State, unless the successor States otherwise agree, "the State
debt of the predecessor State shall pass to the successor States in an equitable proportion, taking into account, in particular, the property, rights
and interests which pass to the successor States in relation to that State
debt". 7' Although the Convention provides for the equitable allocation of
debt, it does not establish any criteria for determining what is an equitable
amount, nor does it permit creditor States to dictate to successor States a
determination of an equitable amount. As with State practice, the Convention does not, however, require creditor States to accept an allocation
the highly general principle that all successor States are obliged to assume some portion of
the debts of the predecessor State: United Netherlands (1830), Union of Colombia (1824),
Czechoslovakia (1939), Yugoslavia (1941), Rwanda-Urundi (1962), and the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1963): ibid.
65. Idem, Vol.1, p.3 8 7 .
66. State Department Memorandum, supra n.60, at p.5. See also Hall's International Law
(4th edn, 1907); the 1972 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
24th Session, UNGA A/8710 (22 July 1972), p.20; and O'Connell, op. cit. supra n.52, at p.387.
67. State Department Memorandum, ibid. Some commentators have suggested that
creditor States may acquire "incorporeal rights to repayment which run with specific territorial project": ibid, referring to O'Connell, idem, p.58.
68. The 1983 Vienna Convention, supran.61, contains separate articles for continuity and
dissolution, but the text of each article is identical.
69. Idem, Art.33 defines State debt as "any financial obligation of a predecessor State
arising in conformity with international law towards another State, an international organization or any other subject of international law".
70. Idem, Art.36.
71. Idem, Arts.40 and 41.
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of debt decided upon by the debtor States which might prejudice the rights
of the creditor States.
The discussion above generates the general conclusion that successor
States are obligated in some manner to accept an equitable share of the
national and territorial debt of the predecessor State. This obligation is
subject, however, to the consent of the successor States. The precise allocation of the debt is determined by the successor States, subject to the final
consent of the creditor States.
(b) Assets. The 1983 Vienna Convention addresses the allocation of
State property among successor States. Although more specifically orientated towards physical property, the Convention defines State property as
"property, rights and interests which, at the date of the succession of
States, were, according to the internal law of the predecessor State, owned
by that State". 73 Unlike the case of debts, the Convention draws a distinction between the treatment of national assets and territorial assets. The
Convention provides that, unless the successor States agree otherwise,
movable State property74 connected with the territory of a particular successor State passes to that State, while movable State property not connected with the territory of a particular successor State passes to the
successor States in equitable proportions. 5
B. The Past Practice of the IMF and World Bank Regarding Successor
State Membership, and the Assumption of the PredecessorState's Assets
and Debts

On a number of previous occasions, the IMF and World Bank have been
faced with the break-up of one of their member States.
1.

The break-up of British India into India and Pakistan

In 1947 British India broke up into the States of India and Pakistan.
India was permitted to retain the seat of British India, with Pakistan being
admitted as a new member in July 1950.76 The question of allocation of
72. With the territorial debt being assumed by the successor State which controls the territory where the product of the debt is located.
73. 1983 Vienna Convention, supra n.61, Art.8.
74. Idem, Art.17 divides property into the categories of immovable and movable. Assets
held by the IMF or World Bank which are liquid are traditionally categorised as movable
property.
75. Idem, Arts.17 and 18.
76. O'Connell, op. cit. supra n.52, at p.189; and World Bank, The Bank's Practice with
Respect to State Succession (25 Nov. 1992). Although the latter deals almost exclusively with
membership questions in the IMF, the resolution of the membership question in the IMF will
dictate the resolution of membership questions in the World Bank. See supra nn.4-7 and
accompanying text.

OCTOBER 1994]

State Succession: IMF and World Bank

debts was not addressed during the break-up of British India as at the time
of break-up no loans had been made to British India.,,
2. The union of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland
into the Federationof Rhodesia and Nyasaland,and its subsequent
dissolution
In 1953 the British colonies of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland joined together to form the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. The Federation then dissolved in 1964. Neither the colonies
nor the Federation had been granted membership in the IMF or World
Bank during this period.
Prior to the creation of the Federation, the World Bank had made one
loan to Southern Rhodesia for a power project, and one to Northern Rhodesia for a railway project.7 8 After its creation the Federation agreed to
assume the liabilities of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia in
respect of their World Bank loans.79 Upon dissolution of the Federation,
the World Bank notified Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia that
it considered them obligated by the terms of the pre-Federation loan
agreement.8 The World Bank did not hold Nyasaland responsible for either of the loans.8 1
In 1958, during the existence of the Federation, the World Bank made
three sets of loans to the Federation in the amount of £140 million.8 The
first loan package, for the development of a railway project for the benefit
of both Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia but not Nyasaland,
was assumed by both Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia upon
the dissolution of the Federation.83 The second loan package was made to
the Federal Power Board of the Federation for the development of a
power project for the benefit of both Southern Rhodesia and Northern
Rhodesia but not Nyasaland, and was guaranteed by the Federation.4
Upon dissolution of the Federation, the Central African Power Corporation, which was the successor corporate entity to the Federal Power
Board, assumed the loan, with Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhode-

77. World Bank, idem, p.2 .
78. Both these loans were guaranteed by the UK: idem, pp.3-4.
79. Idem, p.3.

80. The World Bank also notified the UK that it considered the UK to be bound by its
previous guarantee of the loans: idem, pp.3-4.
81. Ibid.
82. O'Connell, op. ci. supra n.52, at pp.393 and 447.
83. Each State assumed responsibility for 50% of the loan amount: World Bank, op. cit.
supra n.76, at p.4.
84. O'Connell, op. cit. supra n.52, at p.393. The UK also agreed to guarantee the loan
under a separate agreement: World Bank, ibid.
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sia each agreeing to guarantee 50 per cent of the loan amount.8 5 The third
loan, for the development of an agricultural project in Southern Rhodesia,
was assumed by Southern Rhodesia upon the dissolution of the
Federation."
3.

The union of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic, and its

subsequent dissolution

In 1958 Egypt and Syria, both members of the IMF and World Bank,
merged into the unitary State of the United Arab Republic (UAR). The
UAR was permitted to realise membership of both financial institutions
without seeking new membership. It is unclear whether the UAR continued the membership of Egypt, Syria, or both States. When in 1961 Syria
separated from the UAR, it was permitted to retain its previous membership on the rationale that "Syria's identity had been preserved throughout
its merger with Egypt, and the UAR was not disputing the reemergence of
Syria as a separate country".87 Syria was nonetheless obliged to confirm
that it accepted the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and World Bank,
and all the obligations arising under them since the date of Syria's original
admission.8
The unification of Egypt and Syria did not raise any questions of debt
succession since neither had borrowed from the Bank or guaranteed any
loans.8 9 Upon the dissolution of the UAR there was, however, the question of a World Bank loan to the Suez Canal Authority. The World Bank
did not take a formal decision as to the responsibility of the successor
States for this loan but, rather, regarded it as guaranteed by Egypt 0 It is
unclear whether this loan was regarded as guaranteed by Egypt because
the Suez Canal was located in the territory of Egypt or because Egypt
retained the name UAR until 1971. 91
4.

The dissolutionof Rwanda-Urundiinto Rwanda and Burundi
In 1962 the Belgian trust territory of Rwanda-Urundi dissolved into the
States of Rwanda and Burundi. 92 As a trust territory, Rwanda-Urundi did
not hold membership of the IMF or World Bank. However, during the
85. World Bank, ibid.The UK also agreed to continue its guarantee of the loan obligation:
ibid.

86. Idem, p.5. The UK acted as the guarantor of the original loan, and agreed to continue
as guarantor after Southern Rhodesia's assumption of the loan obligations: ibid.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Idem, p.1.
Idem, p.2.

91. Ibid suggests that the loan was guaranteed by Egypt on the rationale that Egypt maintained the name UAR; however, this would appear to be aweak rationale given the history
of State practice relating to territorial debt.
92. Both States subsequently became members of the IMF and World Bank.
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course of Rwanda-Urundi's existence as a trust territory of Belgium, it
received a highway and port project loan of $4.8 million from the World
Bank. 3 Upon the dissolution of the State, the World Bank sought to hold
both successor States jointly and severally liable for the loan. Rwanda
refused to accept any liability for the loan on the ground that the benefits
from the highway and port project accrued entirely within the territory of
Burundi. The disagreement was settled by Belgium agreeing to be held
liable for the loan. 94
5.

The transformationof British Singapore into Singapore

Singapore ceased to be part of the British Commonwealth and joined
with the Malaysian Federation in 1963, a member of the IMF and World
Bank. At the time of Singapore's separation from the British Commonwealth, Singapore held one loan from the World Bank which was guaranteed by the United Kingdom. After the separation, the United Kingdom
continued as the guarantor of the loan. 9
In 1965 Singapore separated from the Malaysian Federation and
became a member of the Bank in its own right in 1966. At the time of
Singapore's association with the Malaysian Federation, Singapore held a
second loan, to the Public Utilities Board of Singapore. After separation
Singapore assumed the obligations under the guarantee agreement, and
the Malaysian Federation was released from future obligations on this
loan. 96 Singapore was apparently not held liable for any of the Malaysian
Federation's national debt that had accrued during the time of its
association. 97
6.

The separationof Bangladeshfrom Pakistan

In 1971 Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) separated from Pakistan.
Pakistan was permitted to retain its membership, with Bangladesh being
admitted as a new member in August 1972. 98
At the time of Bangladesh's separation from Pakistan, the World Bank
had made a number of loans to Pakistan for development projects. Upon
the separation of Bangladesh, Pakistan announced to the World Bank
that it would not service the debt of Bangladesh for projects located within
Bangladesh." Although denying the legitimacy of Pakistan's assertion,
the Bank persuaded Bangladesh to assume liability for projects which
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

O'Connell, op. cit. supra n.52, at p.448.
World Bank, op. cit. supra n.76, at p.2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Idem, p.1.
Idem, p.3.
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were wholly located within its territory.'0 The World Bank was unable to
persuade Bangladesh to accept what it had calculated to be an equitable
share of Pakistan's pre-separation national debt. 0' As a result, the World
Bank notified Pakistan that it would continue to be held liable for the
national debt. Pakistan agreed to this arrangement and serviced the
debt.t0
7.

The union of South Yemen and North Yemen into Yemen

South Yemen and North Yemen, both members of the Bank, merged
into the Republic of Yemen in 1990. The new joint State was not required
to apply for membership, but succeeded to the memberships of South and
North Yemen. 3
8.

Conclusions

Based on the past practice described above, the following general conclusions may be drawn about the practice of the IMF and World Bank in
cases of State succession.
With regard to membership: in the case of continuation the continuing
State retains the membership, with the separating State seeking new
membership;""4 and in the case of dissolution, both successor States
assume the membership of the predecessor State. 05 This conclusion with
regard to dissolution is diluted by the fact that both Egypt and Syria were
members prior to the formation of the UAR and its subsequent
dissolution.
With regard to assumption of debt obligations: in the case of continuation, the continuing State is held liable for the national obligations of the
predecessor State,' 6 with the separating State being held liable for territorial debt;0 7 and in the case of dissolution, the successor States assume
their respective territorial debt.' 8 No precedent has been established with
100. Ibid. In order to persuade Bangladesh to accept liability for projects within its territory that had remained unfinished, the World Bank agreed to provide Bangladesh with 11
"reactivation" credits to finance the completion of those projects: ibid.
101. Ibid. Pakistan's pre-separation national debt to the World Bank consisted of two loans
for industrial imports and two loans to the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan: ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. ldem, p.1.

104. See the separation of Pakistan from India, supra n.76 and accompanying text; and the
separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, supra n.87 and accompanying text.
105. See the dissolution of the UAR, supra n.87 and accompanying text.
106. See separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan, supra n.98 and accompanying text.
107. Ibid, and the separation of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation, supra n.96 and
accompanying text, but see the separation of Singapore from the UK, supra n.95 and
accompanying text.
108. See the dissolution of the UAR, supra n.87 and accompanying text; of RwandaUrundi, supra n.92 and accompanying text; and of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, supra n.78 and accompanying text.
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regard to the allocation of national debt in the circumstances of
dissolution.'09
It is important to note that these consistent precedents developed along
the lines of State practice and the principles set forth in the 1983 Vienna
Convention discussed above, although the primary motivation of the IMF
and World Bank has been to ensure that all outstanding obligations of the
predecessor State are assumed by one or more successor States. 110
III.

THE PRACTICE OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK IN THE CASE OF THE
DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA

THIS article will now turn to the question of how the IMF and World Bank
addressed issues of State succession arising from the break-up of Yugoslavia. Section IV will examine the break-up of Czechoslovakia. In addition
to the questions of what should become of the membership of the former
Yugoslavia, and how Yugoslavia's IMF and World Bank assets and debts
should be allocated, the financial institutions were also faced with the
problems of how to guarantee the payment of Yugoslavia's outstanding
debt and arrears, and how to exclude Serbia/Montenegro temporarily
from participation in the financial institutions."'
A.

Claims of the Successor States and Interests of Member States

As noted above, Serbia/Montenegro claimed to be the continuation of the
former Yugoslavia and thereby entitled to its rights and obligations. In the
case of the IMF and World Bank such a claim included a claim to continue
the membership of Yugoslavia, be entitled to its assets, and be obligated
by its liabilities. Serbia/Montenegro's claim of continuity would naturally
preclude Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia from
succession to membership and any share of Yugoslavia's assets. These
successor States of course asserted that Yugoslavia had dissolved and that
they were equally entitled to succeed to the membership of Yugoslavia
and share in the allocation of its assets.
109. It will be recalled that the UAR had no national debt. See supra n.87 and accompanying text.
110. Cf. the failed World Bank attempt to hold Rwanda and Burundi jointly and severally
liable for territorial debt in Burundi (but settling for assumption by Belgium), with willingness to permit Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia each to assume a 50% liability for
joint territorial debt (and, appropriately, no liability for Nyasaland). Further cf. the willingness of the World Bank to permit the UK to continue to guarantee the obligations of Singapore, but to release the Malaysian Federation from its obligations to guarantee a similar loan
to Singapore. See the failed World Bank attempt to hold Bangladesh liable for the national
debt of the continuing State of Pakistan.
111. Other international financial institutions such as the Paris Club and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development were faced with similar questions arising from
the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as well as the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. An examination of the practice of these institutions is beyond the scope of this article.
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The United States, and most of the members of the European Community, took the position that Yugoslavia had dissolved for purposes of
the IMF and World Bank, and that Serbia/Montenegro should be temporarily excluded from membership, as part of the multilateral effort to punish Serbia/Montenegro for its territorial oppression against
2
Bosnia-Herzegovina."

B. Interim Arrangements
During the early phases of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the World Bank
sought to ensure payment of Yugoslavia's outstanding loan obligations by
entering into interim agreements with the Yugoslav successor States as
they achieved independence. Thus, in February 1992 the World Bank persuaded Slovenia to agree to service the loans disbursed for projects
located within the territory of the Republic of Slovenia. 3 A similar agreement was concluded with Croatia."14 Prior to the separation of Macedonia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, the World Bank entered into
an interim agreement with what remained of Yugoslavia to service outstanding loans identified with projects in that territory." 5 Upon the separation of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the World Bank concluded
additional agreements covering the outstanding obligations identified
with the territory of these successor States. "'6
C.

Considerationof the Consequences of Continuation v. Dissolution

As a first step to addressing the questions of State succession, the IMF and
World Bank made the following determinations regarding the effect of
characterising the break-up of Yugoslavia as either a continuation or a
dissolution.
1. Continuation
Consistent with State practice and the past practice of the financial institutions, the IMF and World Bank determined that, in the case of continuation, the former Yugoslavia would continue to exist in the form of
112. IMF Memorandum: Informal Board Meeting on Yugoslavia (13 Nov. 1992), pp. 1- 2.
113. World Bank, Portfolio of Loans, op. cit. supra n.14, at p.2 .This agreement provided
assurances for $161 million in outstanding loans: ibid. See also World Bank, Effects of the
Territorial Disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (25 Nov.
1992), pp.1-2.
114. World Bank, Portfolio of Loans, ibid. This agreement provided assurances for $155
million in outstanding loans: ibid.
115. Ibid. This agreement provided for assurances covering $1.7 billion in outstanding loan
obligations: ibid.
116. Ibid. The agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina covered $439 million in outstanding
loans, and the agreement with Macedonia $154 million: ibid.
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Serbia/Montenegro." 7 Serbia/Montenegro would be obliged to fulfil the
liabilities of Yugoslavia to the IMF and World Bank, but would also retain
all Yugoslavia's assets." 8 The breakaway republics would retain no liability for the debt of Yugoslavia, and not be entitled to any share of its
assets.'19 Serbia/Montenegro would also be entitled to continue the membership of Yugoslavia, with the breakaway republics being required to
apply for new membership. 20
2.

Dissolution

The IMF and World Bank determined that, in the case of dissolution,
the former Yugoslavia would no longer exist and therefore cease to be a
member of the IMF and World Bank.' The assets and liabilities of
Yugoslavia would be divided among the successor States, 22 with membership of the successor States being determined either through admission or
23
by succession.
D.

Optionsfor Succession

Taking into consideration the consequences associated with the two theories of State succession, the IMF and World Bank developed and considered two possible options for dealing with the question of membership
of the Yugoslav successor States and the allocation of assets and debts:
admission to membership, and succession to membership. 24 Considering
that the international community had rejected Serbia/Montenegro's
claim to be the continuation, the proposals considered by the financial
institutions under the admission and succession options, except one, were
premised on the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
117. IMF, Secession of Territoriesand Dissolution of Members in the Fund (14 July 1992),
p.4; and IMF, Issues of State Succession Concerning Yugoslavia in the Fund (20 Nov. 1992),
p. 1 .
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid. Serbia/Montenegro and the breakaway republics would be free to agree among
themselves to an allocation of the debts and assets of Yugoslavia, but the IMF would continue to hold Serbia/Montenegro solely liable for the debts, and solely entitled to the assets:
Secession, ibid.
120. Secession, ibid. Serbia/Montenegro would retain the quota allocation of Yugoslavia
despite Serbia/Montenegro's reduced size. The breakaway republics would be allocated new
quotas: idem, pp.4-5.
121. Ibid; and IMF, Issues of State Succession, op. cit. supra n.117, at p.1.
122. The IMF would be entitled to allocate the debts and assets of Yugoslavia among the
successor States; however, if a successor State objected to its allocation, that State would be
permitted under Art.XXIX(c) of the IMF Articles of Agreement to submit the dispute to
arbitration: Secession, idem, p.6.
123. Ibid.
124. These options arise only in the case of dissolution since, in the case of separation,
Serbia/Montenegro, as the continuing State, would have retained the membership of Yugoslavia, with the successor States seeking membership anew.
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Because the issue of membership first arose in the IMF, the IMF developed the options for addressing the question of successor State membership. The World Bank, although not obliged to follow the lead of the IMF
on questions of succession, provided substantial comment since, as discussed above, a State may not be a member of the World Bank unless it is a
25
member of the IMF.1
1. Admission to membership
The admission to membership option entailed a determination by the
IMF and World Bank that Yugoslavia had dissolved, and that none of the
successor States would be entitled to assume the seat of the former Yugoslavia. 126Each of the successor States would be required to apply to the IMF
and World Bank as new members in accordance with their standard membership procedures and conditions.'27
Because under this option Yugoslavia's membership would terminate,
the IMF and World Bank would be required to settle accounts with the
successor States. Since the Articles of Agreement do not provide for the
settlement of accounts with dissolved member States, the IMF reasoned
by analogy that the Fund's rules on settlement of accounts with withdrawing members would apply. 2 8 Under this procedure, the successor States
would be required to redeem the shares of Yugoslavia in the SDR department, minus Yugoslavia's SDR shares still held by the department. 29 The
successor States would also lose Yugoslavia's entitlement to share in any
potential capital gains that would result from the disposal of the Fund's
gold reserve through a sale of that gold, or liquidation of the Fund. 30 And,
since the SDRs allocated to Yugoslavia would be cancelled, when the successor States became members they would be entitled to SDRs only in
3
proportion to their quotas. '
The World Bank suggested a modified version of this membership
approach which would have permitted the continuation of the membership of Yugoslavia with individual successor States applying for membership at will. 3 2This approach would have permitted Serbia/Montenegro to
125. See supra n.4 and accompanying text.
126. IMF, Secession, op. cit. supra n.117, at p.7, and Issues ofState Succession, op. cit. supra
n.117, at p.6.
127. Ibid. See IMF Articles of Agreement, Art.II(2); and World Bank Articles of Agreement, Art.lI(2).
128. Secession, ibid.

129. Ibid.This would amount to a debt obligation of $216.76 million to the IMF, and $1.977
billion to the World Bank between the five successor States. See supra nn.13-14 and
accompanying text. It is unlikely that the successor States would have been able to redeem
the SDRs as Serbia/Montenegro was under UN economic sanction, Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina were in the midst of civil war, and Macedonia remained an unrecognised State.
130. Ibid.
131. Idem, p.8.
132. World Bank, Effects of Disintegration,op. cit. supra n.113, at p.7.
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retain the membership of Yugoslavia, complete with Yugoslavia's assets,
while requiring the other successor States to apply anew and forgo any
access to those assets.
2.

Succession to membership

The alternative option to new membership for the successor States was
to permit the successor States to succeed to the membership of Yugoslavia. Succession to the membership of Yugoslavia would entail a finding
that Yugoslavia had dissolved and that each successor State was entitled
to succeed to its membership. 33 The succeeding States would be assigned
a share of Yugoslavia's quota equal to each State's share of Yugoslavia's
assets and liabilities.114The succeeding States would therefore be permitted to retain a share of Yugoslavia's SDRs in proportion to their quota,
and would retain the right to any capital gains that might result from the
future disposal of the Fund's gold.'35
The IMF and World Bank developed three alternative scenarios for
succession: complete, partial and conditional.' The primary variables
motivating the IMF and World Bank to create these options were twofold.
First, there was the concern whether the IMF and World Bank would be
exposed to outstanding liabilities if the successor States did not unanimously agree upon the allocation of debt owed to the IMF and World
Bank. Second, was the political desire to exclude Serbia/Montenegro
from participation in the IMF and World Bank.
(a) Complete succession. The option of complete succession provided
that the IMF and World Bank would make a determination of the allocation of quotas, assets and liabilities and present this determination with
an offer of automatic succession of membership to the successor States.37
When all the successor States had agreed to their respective allocations 1 M
they would be entitled as a group to succeed to membership. If any one
133. This approach treated all the successor States as equal continuing parts of the former
Yugoslavia, which would replace Yugoslavia's membership with their own.
134. IMF, Secession, op. cit. supra n.117, at p.6. The respective financial institution would
be responsible for determining the share of Yugoslavia's quota to be allocated to each successor State.
135. Ibid; and IMF, Issues of State Succession, op. cit. supra n.117, at p.8.
136. The IMF first developed the approaches of complete, partial and conditional succession with the World Bank providing comments on these approaches. See generally IMF,
Secession, op. cit. supra n.117, and World Bank, Effects ofDisintegration,op. cit. supra n.1 13.
137. Idem, pp.8 and 7 respectively. Under this option, the IMF would be permitted to make
the membership offer conditional on certain prerequisites that may be necessary for traditional membership purposes. These prerequisites could include the adoption of necessary
domestic legislation, and payment of the successor State's share of Yugoslavia's arrears:
Secession, ibid.

138. And demonstrated that they had enacted sufficient domestic legislation to carry out
membership of the financial institutions, which was considered a standard prerequisite for
membership: Secession, ibid.
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successor State refused to agree to the allocation, none of the successor
States would be entitled to membership. After succession to membership,
the IMF and World Bank could suspend the membership of any successor
State that did not meet its obligations under the financial institutions'
respective Articles of Agreement.139
The benefit of this approach was that the debt obligations of the predecessor State would be fully obligated prior to any of the successor States
assuming membership. The disadvantages were that it permitted one
State to frustrate, intentionally or unintentionally,'1° the membership of
the other successor States. And it provided for the membership of
Serbia/Montenegro.
(b) Partialsuccession. The partial succession approach provided that
each individual successor State could succeed to the membership of
Yugoslavia as soon as it agreed to its allocation of the quota, assets and
liabilities, and met the necessary prerequisites. 141
The advantage of this approach was that the membership of an individual successor State could not be frustrated by one of its fellow successor
States. The primary disadvantages were that it permitted successor States
to assume membership without the full amount of debt to the IMF and
World Bank being accounted for, and without all the successor States
agreeing among themselves on the allocation of the quota, assets and liabilities.1 42 And, like the complete succession approach, permitted Serbia/
Montenegro to attain membership.
(c) Conditionalsuccession. The conditional succession approach developed by the IMF and opposed by the World Bank provided that the successor States would be entitled to succeed to the membership of
Yugoslavia if they were able to meet specific conditions of succession set
by the IMF. 43 The intent of the conditional succession approach was
139. Ibid; and World Bank, Effects of Disintegration,op. cit. supra n.113, at p.7.
140. The financial institutions were concerned with Serbia/Montenegro's possible intentional frustration, and Bosnia-Herzegovina's unintentional frustration through an inability
to agree to service its share of the allocation of debt.
141. IMF, Secession, op. cit. supra n.117, at pp.9-10. Each successor State would also have
to meet the standard prerequisites for membership, which included the enactment of domestic legislation necessary for carrying out the obligations of membership of the financial
institutions: ibid.
142. This would occur where a successor State either did not obtain membership, and could
therefore not be held accountable for the debts of the predecessor State; or where a successor State objected to the allocation of its share of quota, assets or liabilities and pursued
arbitration under Art.XXIX(c) of the IMF Articles of Agreement. The IMF attempted to
circumvent this problem by proposing in its description of the partial succession approach

that the offer of succession to each successor State stipulate that the succession would be
subject to the agreement of all the successor States as to the allocation of assets and liabilities:
Secession, idem, p.10. Such a stipulation would, however, transform the partial succession
approach into the complete succession approach and permit a single successor State to frustrate the membership of the other successor States by not agreeing to the allocation.
143. IMF, Issues of State Succession, op. cit. supra n.117, at p.7.
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specifically both to develop a succession model whereby all the successor
States with the exclusion of Serbia/Montenegro could succeed to membership and to condition the succession to membership on an agreement
of each particular State's allocation of Yugoslavia's debt and assets. The
two proposals for conditions developed by the IMF were as follows.
(c)(i) Succession as deemed appropriate.The first proposal made succession to membership conditional upon a finding by the IMF that an offer
of succession would be appropriate at a particular time, with an offer of
succession being deemed inappropriate if there were strong opposition
among the members of the IMF to the membership of a particular State.'"
The IMF suggested this condition derived from Article II, section 2 of the'
IMF Articles of Agreement, which provides that membership shall be
open to States at such times and in accordance with such terms as may be
stipulated by the IMF. 45 Although disguised as a timing condition, this
condition basically sets forth the requirement that a State may be denied
an offer of succession if such an offer would be opposed by a significant
number of the IMF member States.
Two separate cases of precedent within the IMF constrained its ability
to pursue this condition of appropriateness. The first arose from previous
findings by the IMF, in the context of admission of small States, that although it could delay membership applications for a period of time until
the criteria for membership had been met,' 46 it could not delay applications indefinitely with the purpose of frustrating membership1 47 Although delays frequently occurred between submission of a membership
application and admission, these delays were directly related to the applicant's ability to meet the criteria for membership, and did not occur after
the State had met those criteria.'"
The second restraining precedent also occurred in the context of the
admission of small States. Relying on the International Court of Justice's
Advisory Opinion on the Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 49 the IMF had previously determined that it
could impose only criteria for membership that were directly derived from
the IMF Articles of Agreement. 50 And that, once an applicant had met the
criteria for membership, it was entitled to membership. 5'
144. Idem, pp.7-12.
145. Idem, p.8.
146. The criteria for membership are that the State seeking membership must be a sovereign State able and willing to fulfil the obligations of membership: idem, p.9 .
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid.
149. I.C.J. Rep. 1948,57.
150. IMF, Issues of State Succession, op. cit. supra n.117, at p.10.
151. Ibid. Despite the IMF's keen reluctance to create new criteria for membership, it readily adopted the view that requiring all the successor States to agree to the allocation of
responsibility for shares of liabilities and assets prior to the succession of any one successor
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The IMF also reasoned that the discretionary condition of "appropri-

ateness" would have the effect of negating the offer of succession, as "an
offer that remains subject to the entire discretion of the offeror is not a
conditional offer; it is not an offer at all".5 2 From this premise, the IMF
reasoned that a conditional offer based on "appropriateness" would not
constitute a valid offer, and the absence of a valid offer at the time of
dissolution would result in the requirement that all successor States apply
for membership anew.'53
(c)(ii) Succession based on ability to meet the obligationsof the Articles

ofAgreement. The second proposal made succession to membership conditional upon the ability and willingness of the successor States to fulfil the
obligations of membership as set forth in the Articles of Agreement. This
condition derives from the IMF's implicit authority to require that a State
is capable of carrying out its obligations to the IMF before membership is
54
granted.
In order to transform this implicit requirement into an explicit requirement capable of excluding Serbia/Montenegro, the IMF developed the
additional condition that the IMF affirmatively determine that the successor State is "able to meet its obligations under the Articles".'55 Relieving any doubt that this criterion was intended to exclude
Serbia/Montenegro from membership, the IMF noted in proposing the
condition that the finding of ability would include "an assessment of the
probability that the successor state is, and will remain in the foreseeable

future, able to fulfil its obligations, including its financial obligations to the
State would be consistent with the Articles of Agreement in the context of succession of
membership: idem, pp. 10 - 1 1 .
152. Idem, p.11. The IMF also reasoned that the condition of appropriateness to be determined by the membership of the IMF would have the effect of transferring the authority for
membership decisions from the executive board to the members and that this would be
inconsistent with its Articles of Agreement: ibid.
153. Idem, p.12.
154. Idem, p.7.
155. Idem, pp.7-8. During development of this condition, representatives of the US, the
EC and the Organisation of Islamic States agreed that: "It would be made clear in the
accompanying Board discussion that the Board regarded the existence of UN sanctions as
precluding 'reasonable assurance' that IMF obligations could be fulfilled. The Board's view
on this latter point would then provide the means of excluding Serbia/Montenegro from
membership, without explicitly predicating the Fund's actions on those of the UN": IMF
Memorandum, supra n.1 12, at p.l. In carrying through on this promise, the IMF executive
board agreed that its managing director would make, inter alia, the following statement at the
14 Dec. 1992 meeting concerning the succession to membership of the Yugoslav republics:
"In assessing the ability of each successor to meet its membership obligations, the Fund will
take into account all relevant factors, and particular attention will be given to the effect of
sanctions imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations": IMF, Statement by the
Managing Director on the SFR Yugoslavia (11 Dec. 1992). A similar statement was made yet
again by the chairman of the executive board of the IMF on 14 Dec. 1992 immediately before
the board agreed to pursue the conditional succession approach: IMF, Statement by the
Chairman of the Executive Board.
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Fund. In this respect, the expected effect on the country of international
sanctions would be relevant.""'
In addition to the "willing and able" condition, the IMF also proposed
that succession be conditional on the requirement that the successor State
"be current with the Fund at the time of succession".1 57 And, in order to
disguise the subjectivity of the first condition, the IMF proposed that succession also be conditional on the successor State adopting "any necessary
legislation to accept the offer and to carry out its membership
obligations".1 58
The World Bank's General Counsel voiced criticism with this conditional succession approach and characterised it as "at best legally questionable" on the grounds that it was inconsistent with past practice and
would expose the financial institutions to the possibility of non-assumption of a significant portion of Yugoslavia's outstanding obligations. 59
The General Counsel first objected to the conditional approach on the
ground that it blurs the line between admission and succession by making
the succession of member States conditional on discretionary case-bycase determinations to be made by the financial institutions.", The World
Bank views membership questions as subject to criteria, while succession
is an automatic occurrence. Thus, conditions might be appropriate in the
case of new membership, but in the case of succession a State is either a
successor State or it is not. If the World Bank therefore treats a succession
issue as a membership issue, an excluded State might successfully claim
before a board of arbitration that the World Bank's inappropriate
exclusion of that State provides cause for the excluded State to be relieved
of the obligation to pay its share of the predecessor State's liabilities. 6'
The General Counsel also objected to the specific condition that the
IMF make a determination that the individual successor States are willing
and able to carry out the obligations of membership. 62 Recognising that
this condition was politically motivated and would provide the tool to
exclude Serbia/Montenegro, the General Counsel considered that an
arbitral tribunal might find the question to be fraught with subjectivity and
that the executive directors of the Bank might act inappropriately as representatives of the political will of their sponsoring countries, and not as
unbiased determiners of ability and willingness. 63
8
156. IMF, Issues of State Succession, op. cit. supra n.117, at p. .

157. Idem, pp.7-8.
158. Ibid. In the proposals of complete succession and partial succession discussed above,
the IMF treats the "necessary legislation" requirement as a prerequisite to membership, but
not as an explicit condition.
159. World Bank, Effects of Disintegration, op. cit. supra n.l 13, at p.5.
160. World Bank, Comments on the "ConditionalSuccession" Approach Envisaged in the

Fund's Paper(25 Nov. 1992), pp. 1- 2 .

161. Idem, p.2; and World Bank, Effects of Disintegration,op. cit. supra n.113, at pp.5-6.
162. Comments, ibid.

163. Ibid. Although the World Bank correctly identifies the "ability and willingness" deter-
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Finally, the General Counsel objected to the IMF's conditional
approach on the ground that it did not make the succession of the member
States conditional on their unanimous agreement on the apportionment
of Yugoslavia's assets in and obligations to the financial institutions.164 The
General Counsel contended that lack of agreement might subject the
Bank to arbitration by a successor State not agreeing to its allocation of
responsibility. The concerns of the General Counsel here are inconsistent
with his argument that succession may not be conditional, and that either .
succession of membership occurs as a matter of law or the States must seek
5
new membership.1
As a result of these criticisms, the World Bank's General Counsel found
66
that only three approaches to succession would be legally defensible:1
(1) assume the dissolution of Yugoslavia and require the successor
States to seek membership anew;
(2) delay action on the membership of Yugoslavia and permit the
individual successor States to apply for membership anew; and
(3) permit the automatic succession of all the successor States
simultaneously.
Despite the reservations of the World Bank, the IMF pursued the conditional succession approach.
E. Decision of the IMF and World Bank
1. IMF

On 15 December 1992 the IMF announced that it "found that [Yugoslavia] has ceased to exist and has therefore ceased to be a member of the
IMF".167 The IMF considered the States of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia/Montenegro to be the successors to the
assets and liabilities of Yugoslavia in the IMF, and had allocated those
assets and liabilities among the successor States, as well as the quota of the
former Yugoslavia.168
mination as a political question, the fervour of the Bank's opposition to the condition is
disproportionate as the Bank confuses the "ability and willingness" determination with the
alternative condition of "as appropriate".
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid. The General Counsel here argues that succession may be conditional on an
acceptance of the allocation of responsibility for assets and debts, and that if this acceptance
is not unanimous the succession model should be abandoned and the States should seek
membership anew: idem, pp. 3 - 4 .
166. World Bank, Effects of Disintegration, op. cit. supra n.113, at pp.6-7.
167. IMF Press Release, supra n.13.
168. The IMF allocated the shares in the following manner: Slovenia 16.39%, Croatia
28.49%, Bosnia-Herzegovina 13.20%, Macedonia 5.40% and Serbia/Montenegro 36.52%:
idem, p.2. The determination of the allocation of assets and liabilities was based on the determination of each successor State's share in Yugoslavia's quota: IMF, Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia Cessation of Membership, Allocation of Assets and Liabilities in the
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The successor States were permitted to notify the IMF within one
month whether they agreed to their allocations of assets and liabilities.
The IMF provided that if a particular successor successfully challenged its
allocation of assets and liabilities, the shares of the other successor States
would be adjusted on a pro rata basis. 169
Formal succession to membership of Yugoslavia in the IMF would be
open to all successor States at such time as they met the following

'onditions:1

70

(1) notification to the IMF that the State agrees to the allocation of
its share in the assets and liabilities of Yugoslavia;
(2) notification to the IMF that the State agrees "in accordance with
its law, to succeed to the membership in accordance with the
terms and conditions specified by the IMF and has taken all the
necessary steps to enable it to succeed to such membership and
carry out all of its obligations under the Articles of Agreement";
(3) it has been determined by the IMF that the State is "able to meet
its obligations under the Articles"; and
(4) the State has no overdue financial obligations to the IMF.
The IMF provided that the successor States would have a period of up to
six months within which to meet these conditions. 71
Subsequent to this decision of the IMF, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia have succeeded to membership of the IMF. Serbia/Montenegro's request for succession has been denied, and the
six-month period has expired.
2.

World Bank

On 25 February 1993 the executive directors of the World Bank determined that Yugoslavia had ceased to exist and that the shares of Yugoslavia's assets and liabilities in the Bank would pass to the successor States,
with those States being permitted to succeed to the2 membership of Yugoslavia upon the satisfaction of certain conditions.1
The World Bank's determination of dissolution and opportunity for
succession differed from the IMF's in two important respects. First, the
World Bank secured agreement among all the successor States regarding
1 2
Fund, and Succession to Membership in the Fund(7 Dec. 1992), pp. - .The quota was deterto
the
other successor States
size
in
relation
economic
new
State's
basis
of
each
on
the
mined
and the former Yugoslavia: IMF, Quota Calculationsfor the SuccessorRepublics of Yugosla1
via (7 Dec. 1992), p. .
169. IMF Press Release, supra n.13, at p.1.
170. Idem, pp.1-2.
171. ldem, p.1.
172. World Bank, Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia Termination of Membership
and Succession to Membership, Executive Directors' Res. No.93-2 (25 Feb. 1993); see also
World Bank Press Release No.93/S43 (26 Feb. 1993).
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their allocations of assets prior to announcing the dissolution of Yugoslavia.'73 And, although attaching conditions to the succession of membership, 174 the World Bank did not require a specific finding that a particular
successor State would be able to carry out the obligations required under
the Articles of Agreement. The World Bank was able to forgo the requirement of a finding of ability in order to exclude Serbia/Montenegro as Serbia/Montenegro could not succeed to membership in the World Bank
until it had succeeded to membership in the IMF. 7 '
Subsequent to the decision of the World Bank, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia have succeeded to membership in the
World Bank, with Serbia/Montenegro being prohibited from seeking succession until it has attained membership in the IMF.
IV.

THE PRACTICE OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK IN THE CASE OF THE
DISSOLUTION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the IMF and World Bank
attempted to deal with the issues of succession along the same lines as
Yugoslavia, with a couple of significant exceptions.
TURNING

A.

Claims of the Successor States

One month prior to the scheduled dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the
respective Finance Ministers from Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia requested that the IMF and World Bank permit the Czech
Republic and Slovakia to succeed to the membership of Czechoslova-

173. World Bank Res., idem, p.1.
174. The World Bank provided (idem, p.2) that upon succession to the IMF, a successor
State may succeed to membership of the World Bank provided it has: "(a) notified the Bank
that: (1) it has accepted, in accordance with its law, as successor to the SFRY, the Articles of
Agreement and the terms and conditions relating to the subscription of Yugoslavia to the
capital stock of the Bank with respect to the shares assumed by the said successor Republic;
and (2) it has taken all steps necessary to carry out these obligations; and the successor
Republic has furnished to the Bank such information in respect of the notification as the
Bank shall have requested; (b) made such payments as are necessary with respect to the
shares of the Bank's capital stock to be allocated to it, taking into account payments already
made by the SFRY and allocated to such Republic; (c) entered into a final agreement with
the Bank on the loans made by the Bank to or with the guarantee of Yugoslavia which the
said Republic assumes; and (d) eliminated, or agreed with the Bank on a plan to eliminate,
arrears, if any, in the servicing of Bank loans made to or with the guarantee of the SFRY
assumed by the successor Republic."
175. See supra n.4 and accompanying text.
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kia.' 76 The Finance Ministers also notified the IMF and World Bank that
the republics had agreed to divide the assets and liabilities pursuant to the
territorial principle for territorial debt, and on the basis of the population
7
ratio in each republic (two to one) for national debt.' "

B.

Considerationof the Czech and Slovak Republics' Claim for
Continuation of Membership

In the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the General Counsel of
the IMF did not propose the potential application of complete succession
or partial succession, or the modalities of conditional succession, but,
rather, simply considered that the case of Czechoslovakia should follow
the model of conditional succession. 7 The proposed conditions to be
placed on the succession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia were identical with those placed on the successor States to Yugoslavia, with two

exceptions.7 9
With the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the IMF deemed it unnecessary to make succession conditional on a finding by the IMF that a particular successor State is willing and able to carry out the obligations of
membership."' The IMF reasoned that such a finding is "normally made
implicitly by the Fund in the context of applications for membership and it
does not appear necessary to require an explicit finding in the present
case".""1
However, unlike in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the IMF provided that succession had to take place simultaneously."2 The condition of
simultaneous membership approach combines the conditional succession
model and the complete succession model, and represents a condition not

176. Letter from Jan Klak, Minister of Finance of the CSFR, Ivan Kacarnik, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Finance of the Czech Republic, and Julius Toth, Mifiister of Finance
of the Slovak Republic, to Lewis Preston, President of the World Bank Group (4 Dec. 1992).
177. Ibid.
178. IMF, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Cessation of Membership, Allocation of
Assets and Liabilities in the Fund, and Succession to Membership in the Fund (21 Dec. 1992),
pp. 1 - 3 .
179. The IMF (idem, p.3) proposed that the Czech and Slovak Republics should be entitled
to succeed to the membership of Czechoslovakia simultaneously when they had: (1) consented to the allocation of assets and liabilities as determined by the fund; (2) agreed to
become "members in accordance with the terms and conditions of membership specified in
the decision" and "taken all the necessary steps to that effect and to carry out their obligations under the Articles"; and (3) cleared any arrears owed to the IMF.
180. Idem, pp.1-3.
181. Ibid.
182. World Bank, Yugoslavia Cessation, op. cit. supra n.14, at p.5.
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found in prior practice of the financial institutions, or based on their Articles of Agreement. The probable rationale for this combination is that the
IMF wished to use the political influence of the successor States over each
other if either of them objected to its share of the allocation of assets and
liabilities.
The World Bank found no objection to the position of the IMF and
proposed to proceed along the same lines. 83 In concurring with the position of the IMF the World Bank noted that this approach did not suffer
from the defect of being "legally questionable" as none of the proposed
conditions "required judgments on the part of the Bank's Management or
Executive Directors".' 84
C. Decision of the IMF and World Bank
Prior to the decision of the IMF and World Bank on the question of membership succession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the Prime Ministers of both republics notified the IMF and World Bank that they accepted
the respective allocation of the assets and liabilities of the former Czechoslovakia as proposed by the financial institutions, and had enacted all
necessary legislation to carry out the obligations of membership.' 5
1. IMF
Subsequent to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the IMF permitted
the Czech Republic and Slovakia to succeed to the membership of the
former Czechoslovakia simultaneously and under the conditions mentioned above. 1'
2.

World Bank
On 4 January 1993 the World Bank passed Executive Directors' Resolution 93-1, which provided that the membership of the Czech Republic
and Slovakia was to be substituted for Czechoslovakia's membership of
the World Bank 87 The resolution also allocated the assets and liabilities
of the former Czechoslovakia among the successor States, and provided
that the membership would be subject to similar conditions as required by
the IMF.'m
183. World Bank, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic Succession to Membership Status of
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (23 Dec. 1992), p.2 .
184. Ibid.
185. Letter from Dr Vaclav Klaus, Prime Minister of Czech Republic. to Michael Camdessus, IMF Managing Director (21 Dec. 1992); and letter from Vladimir Meciar, Prime
Minister of the Slovak Republic to Camdessus (17 Dec. 1992).
186. See supra n.179 and accompanying text.
187. Czech Republic and Slovak Republic-Succession to the Membership ofthe Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic, World Bank Res. No.93-1 (4 Jan. 1993).
188. Idem, pp.3-5. In this case the mention of conditions served merely a procedural role as
both successor States had already complied with them.
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CONCLUSION

As a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the IMF
and World Bank have for the first time developed a conditional succession
approach to address the questions posed by the break-up of a member
State. The succession aspect of the approach was born out of the desire to
preserve the assets of successor States, while the conditional aspect was
born out of the political desire to exclude the participation of Serbia/Montenegro, and the financial desire to provide for complete assumption of
the debt obligations of the predecessor States. This approach adopted by
the IMF and opposed by the World Bank derived its basis from the international law of succession, and the past practice of the IMF and World
Bank, but quickly moved beyond the basic principles established therein.
The desire to provide the successor States with a mechanism to succeed
to the membership of the predecessor State, and to assume the assets and
debts of the predecessor State, is well founded in international law and
past practice. However, the addition of political criteria, no matter how
disguised, finds no basis in either international law or the past practice of
the financial institutions.
Nonetheless, the mere fact that making succession conditional on political criteria has no basis in international law or past practice does not
invalidate such conditions. What does, however, weaken the authority to
impose political conditions is the arbitrary and inconsistent approach taken by the IMF and World Bank with regard to the imposition of those
conditions. The condition that a State must be found by the IMF to be
capable of carrying out its rights and obligations, although established for
political reasons, has some basis in the IMF's Articles of Agreement. Yet,
if the true motive for the financial institutions was to ensure succession
consistent with the Articles of Agreement, then the World Bank should
also have imposed that condition on the Yugoslav successor States, 89 and
both the IMF and World Bank should have made the succession of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia conditional on a similar finding.
Similarly, despite the World Bank's view that the imposition of conditions was legally questionable, it imposed the condition that the successor States must unanimously agree to the allocation of the
predecessor's assets and debts. The IMF and World Bank also imposed
the condition of simultaneous succession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which has no basis in international law or past practice.
Once the reservations against conditional succession had been overcome or disregarded, the IMF and World Bank proceeded to attach con189. Although the World Bank was afforded the luxury of not having to impose this condition since SerbialMontenegro could not become a member of the World Bank until it had
achieved membership of the IMF, the imposition of that condition would have demonstrated
the consistency and objectivity of the IMF's and World Bank's approach.
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ditions on a case-by-case basis, with little concern for consistency. The
dangers involved in this approach are that Serbia/Montenegro, or any
future successor State faced with similarly inconsistent conditions, might
successfully contend before an arbitration tribunal that it has been
unjustly precluded from the right to succeed to the membership and assets
of the predecessor State, and therefore should not be deemed liable for
any portion of the debts of the predecessor State.
In adjudicating such a claim, the arbitral tribunal would look to the
rational basis for the imposition of the specific conditions. Although the
tribunal might be able to determine a rational basis for the particular condition imposed on Serbia/Montenegro, the immediate practice of the IMF
and World Bank would threaten such a determination by casting doubt on
the entire practice of conditional succession, and the true motivation of
the financial institutions for the imposition of particular conditions,
regardless of their apparently rational basis.

